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TORTS
William E. Crawford*
ELECTRICAL UTILITY LIABILITY FOR ELECTROCUTIONS**
"What's in a name? That which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet."'
Has the Louisiana Supreme Court, in Levi v. Southwest Louisiana
Electric Membership Coop.,2 applied strict liability, called by the name
of negligence, to electrical utility companies in electrocution cases? While
retaining ostensibly the name of negligence for the standard of care
governing the companies, the court has structured the plaintiff's burden
of proof so that it fits nicely into the court's own definition of strict
liability3 by effectively eliminating plaintiff's burden to prove foresee-
ability of risk. The opinion appears to be tailored to those cases in
which the company has no actual knowledge of the risk.
The duty of the power company under Levi is:
1. "[W]hen the power company realizes or should realize that
the transmission of electricity through its line presents an un-
reasonable risk of causing physical harm to another, it is under
a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk from taking
effect."
4
2. "A power company is required to recognize that its conduct
involves a risk of causing harm to another if a reasonable person
would do so .. ."
3. The power company further has the "obligation to make
reasonable inspections of wires and other instrumentalities in
order to discover and remedy hazards and defects.' '6
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* James J. Bailey Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
** Electrocution is used here to apply generally to injury from electricity.
1. W. Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act II, Scene II, 2.43.
2. 542 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1989).
3. Hunt v. City Stores, Inc., 387 So. 2d 585 (La. 1980). "The distinction between
the two theories of recovery lies in the fact that the inability of a defendant to know
or prevent the risk is not a defense in a strict liability case but precludes a finding of
negligence." Id. at 588.
4. 542 So. 2d at 1084.
5. Id. (emphasis added).
6. Id. (emphasis added).
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4. "[A] company will be considered to have constructive knowl-
edge of an electrical hazard which has existed for a period of
time which would reasonably permit discovery had the company
adequately performed its duties." '7
It is on the point of foreseeability (recognizing, realizing) of the
particular risk that most of the battle has occurred in prior electrocution
litigation. Typically the utility prevailed in a case when it convinced the
trier of fact that the risk was unforeseen or unforeseeable or, in more
practical terms, that the company had no notice of the existence of the
dangerous condition. Under the rule of Levi, if the accident is found
to have been the result of a hazard that has existed for a period of
time that would reasonably permit discovery, the company will be deemed
as a matter of law to have constructive knowledge of the risk. Fore-
seeability of the risk will thus be established as a matter of law and
the company will as a matter of law be negligent.'
The establishment of foreseeability as a matter of law occurs through
still another rule in Levi. If the company "is required to recognize that
its conduct involves the risk of causing harm to another if a reasonable
person would do so," 9 then the court's finding of an unremedied hazard
carries with it the finding of foreseeability, because the company, as a
matter of law, "recognized" the risk.
With foreseeability of the risk established, the next issue is whether
the risk was unreasonable (and if it is so found, then liability follows).
If the risk which took effect as plaintiff's injuries was an un-
reasonable one, and the power company failed to comply with
a duty or standard of care requiring it to take precautions against
that danger, the risk was within the scope of the defendant's
duty and defendant's substandard conduct was a legal cause of
the injuries. 0
It seems that any electrocution is the result of a predetermined
unreasonable risk, if the elements of the balancing process are evaluated
in accordance with Levi.
Since there are occasions when high voltage electricity will escape
from an uninsulated transmission line, and since, if it does, it
becomes a menace to those about the point of its escape, the
7. Id. at 1084-85 (emphasis added).
8. "Accordingly, the power company was guilty of negligence that was a legal cause
of plaintiff's injuries, or, in other words, the company breached its duty to take precautions
against the risk that took effect as those injuries, and the lower courts committed manifest
error in not reaching this conclusion." Id. at 1089.
9. Id. at 1084 (emphasis added).
10. Id.
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power company's duty, as in other similar situations, to provide
against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) the
possibility that the electricity will escape; (2) the gravity of the
resulting injury, if it does; and (3) the burden of taking adequate
precautions that would avert the mishap. When the product of
the possibility of escape multiplied times the gravity of the harm,
if it happens, exceeds the burden of precautions, the failure to
take those precautions is negligence."
The balancing process as stated above seems to require the finding
of an unreasonable risk in every instance of electrocution. If the pos-
sibility (likelihood?) of escape is given the lowest possible value of "one,"
(on a scale of one to ten) and since it is life itself, or serious personal
injury, that is threatened, a value of "ten" is given to the factor of
gravity of harm; and if for burden of precaution, a value of "three"
is given (since the court described it as a "minimal" value), it is apparent
that any electrocution must be found to be the result of an unreasonable
risk, because the gravity of harm value by itself will exceed the "min-
imal" cost of prevention.
Weber v. Fidelity & Casualty Insurance Co. of N. Y. 2 used a very
similar structure to establish our first products liability cause of action
in what is now recognized as strict products liability. In Weber, upon
a finding that a product was defective (unreasonably dangerous to normal
use), the manufacturer was imputed with knowledge of the defect, this
knowledge amounting to foreseeability of the risk of injury in the
product, and that foreseeability of risk amounting to negligence. Neg-
ligence thus resulted as a matter of law and was not rebuttable.
The same legal effect seems to occur in the Levi structure of neg-
ligence for power companies and is quite a departure from prior state-
ments of duty binding the power companies. In Simon v. Southwest
Louisiana Electric Membership,3 the supreme court said "operators of
power lines are not required to anticipate every possible accident which
may occur and are not the insurers of safety of persons moving around
power lines in the course of everyday living." In Hebert v. Gulf States
Utilities Co., "4 the court further stated that power companies "are re-
quired to exercise the utmost care to reduce hazards to life as far as
practicable. . . However, an electric utility is not required to guard
against situations which cannot reasonably be expected or contem-
plated." 5
I. Id. at 1087.
12. 259 La. 599, 250 So. 2d 754 (1971).
13. 390 So. 2d 1265, 1268 (La. 1980).
14. 426 So. 2d III (La. 1983).
15. Id. at 114.
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On what issues, then, may the power company offer a possible
defense under Levi? One point is to attempt to show that the hazard
did not exist for a sufficient period of time to permit discovery. The
viability of that defense depends upon the amount of time that the court
is willing to allow the company to discover and remedy the risks. The
supreme court, in Briggs v. Hartford Ins. Co.,16 imposed a similar duty
to discover hazards on the state and municipalities. The court said that
"[g]overnmental bodies are held to a standard of reasonable prudence
and care in discovering hazards .... Therefore, DOTD was charged
with constructive notice of the hazard.' ' 7 The court found that DOTD
had constructive knowledge of the hazardous condition because the
traffic controls in question "were regularly inspected. '"'8 A system of
regular inspection might, therefore, further seal the fate of power com-
panies.
Will a defendant power company be permitted to introduce general
evidence of reasonable care for consideration by the jury? Will a jury
be allowed to find a power company not liable despite the injury if it
hears testimony that a thorough and diligent system of inspection and
reaction to hazard is regularly enforced by the company? Will a jury
still be entitled to find that compliance with the height regulations for
electrical transmission lines amounts to reasonable care in the prevention
of hazards? The opinion, in a fundamental pronouncement, says that
a risk is within the defendant's scope of duty "[i]f the risk which took
effect as plaintiff's injuries was an unreasonable one, and the power
company failed to comply with a duty or standard of care requiring it
to take precautions against that danger."' 9 This crucial statement may
be interpreted two ways: (1) After the finding of unreasonable risk, the
company may introduce evidence of reasonable care. But according to
basic negligence analysis, unreasonable risk and reasonable care are
mutually exclusive, 20 to the extent that a jury verdict on special inter-
rogatories finding both would be an inconsistent verdict. (2) More likely,
the statement means that if the injury occurred as the result of an
unreasonable risk, as a matter of law the company breached its duty
to inspect, discover, and remedy.
There are critical questions yet to be answered to determine whether
Levi has in fact established strict liability-in the name of negligence-
for utility companies.
16. 532 So. 2d 1154 (La. 1988).
17. Id. at 1157.
18. Id.
19. 542 So. 2d 1081, 1084 (La. 1989) (emphasis added).
20. Terry, Negligence, 29 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1915).
[Vol. 50
